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‘No longer to think of oneself’.—let us reflect seriously upon this question: why
do we leap after someone who has fallen into the water in front of us, even
though we feel no kind of affection for him? Out of pity: at that moment we are
thinking only of the other person—thus says thoughtlessness. Why do we feel
pain and discomfort in common with someone spitting blood, though we may
even be ill-disposed towards him? Out of pity: at that moment we are not
thinking of ourself—thus says the same thoughtlessness. The truth is: in the
feeling of pity—I mean in that which is usually and misleadingly called pity—we
are, to be sure, not consciously thinking of oneself but are doing so very strongly
unconsciouslyyAn accident which happens to another offends us: it would make
us aware of our impotence, and perhaps of our cowardice, if we did not go to
assist him. Or it brings with it in itself a diminution of our honour in the eyes of
others or in our own eyes. Or an accident and suffering incurred by another
constitutes a signpost to some danger to us; and it can have a painful effect upon
us simply as a token of human vulnerability and fragility in general.
(Nietzsche 1881: §133)
Iycame to recognize the major importance for identification of certain projective
mechanisms which are complementary to the introjective ones. The process
which underlies the feeling of identification with other people, because one has
attributed qualities or attitudes of one’s own to them, was generally taken for
granted even before the corresponding concept was incorporated in psycho-
analytic theory. For instance, the projective mechanism underlying empathy is
familiar in everyday life.
(Klein 1955: 142–3)
We are inclined to attribute to other people—in a sense, to put into them—some
of our own emotions and thoughtsyBy attributing part of our feelings to the
other person, we understand their feelings, needs and satisfactions; in other
words, we are putting ourselves into the other person’s shoes. There are people
who go so far in this direction that they lose themselves entirely in others and
become incapable of objective judgement.
(Klein 1959: 252–3)
Empathy is a topic that has figured in a great deal of recent philosophical
discussion. This is due in large part to spillover from the debate within the
philosophy of mind about the basis of our psychological understanding of others.
The exercise in psychological modelling that, simulationists have suggested (in
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opposition to the ‘theory theorists’), serves as our means of gaining interpersonal
psychological understanding, overlaps significantly with empathy, as it is
ordinarily understood, and this has given rise to much discussion of the precise
relationship between simulation and empathy.1 The simulationist position has
impinged also on moral philosophy, insofar as some of its advocates have
claimed that the same empathic capacity underlies (some) moral thinking and
generates moral motivation.2 And work in aesthetics has drawn on the same
model to explain our emotional responses to fiction.3
Of course this ‘new wave’ of philosophical interest in empathy, thrown up by
the development of simulation theory, is just that: earlier thinkers had argued for
the relevance of empathy in each of these areas without the benefit of the precise
description of its functioning that some simulationists have claimed to provide.
Advocates of simulation theory frequently point out that Collingwood’s early
twentieth century claims about the mode of understanding appropriate to
history—an imaginative reconstruction, on the part of the historian, of the
thoughts of earlier peoples—have much in common with their own. In moral
philosophy, Schopenhauer’s Mitleid (usually translated as ‘compassion’), the
capacity for which, he claimed, provides the basis of morality, is recognisably an
empathic experience. There is overlap too between the conception of sympathy in
Hume’s and Smith’s moral philosophy, and that of empathy in contemporary
discussion.4 And it was in aesthetic theory that the term ‘empathy’ was first
coined: the English word entered the language in the early years of the twentieth
century as a translation of the term Einfuhlu¨ng (‘feeling into’) that had recently
been coined in German to characterise a type of aesthetic response.5
Empathy, then, has been of longstanding interest to philosophers. But these
various treatments of the theme display a conspicuous lack of unity. Those in the
earlier wave were each formulated quite independently of the others; in the more
recent discussion, heavily influenced by the simulationist research programme,
there is a greater appearance of unity, insofar as part of the point of the discussion
has been to show the explanatory weight that the hypothesised simulationist
mechanism might bear. Yet, as I argue below, there is an air of contrivance about
the way empathy is conceived within this framework.
My aim in this paper is to consider empathy from the perspective of
psychoanalytical theory. In particular, I explore a suggestion casually advanced
in the writings of Melanie Klein, and endorsed by some of her followers. The
suggestion to be elaborated is that empathy has its basis in projective
identification, an unconscious mechanism of defence. Although this suggestion
may at first sight be startling, I argue that, when it is construed along the
lines suggested by some of Klein’s followers, it is intuitively plausible. It is
valuable too because it articulates a normative dimension according to which
exercises of empathy can be assessed. Again, I claim that this dimension
corresponds to an important everyday insight. And further, I suggest that it
provides a convincing endorsement and substantiation of Nietzsche’s famous
rejection of Schopenhauer’s ethics. In pursuing these ideas I mean to further the
case, advanced in the writings of several recent philosophers (Cavell, Deigh,
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Scheffler, Lear, Wollheim), for thinking that psychoanalysis has something of
value to offer moral philosophy.
Psychoanalytical theory provides a comprehensive account of the mind,
developed over many decades and incorporating a vast corpus of clinical data,
within which it is natural to hope that empathy might be accommodated. This
paper only begins to explore this possibility, an adequate explanation of which
would require far more space. My final section, widening the focus of the earlier
ones, briefly examines some psychoanalytical claims about the development and
structure of the personality, in relation to which a fuller account would aim to
situate empathy.
It might reasonably be thought that the first step in this discussion ought to be
to define empathy. And presumably, if one aim here is to evaluate some theoretical
appropriations of empathy, the definition ought to be maximally theoretically
neutral. That turns out to be hard because, as mentioned earlier, the word
‘empathy’ first entered the English language (via German) as a new term within
aesthetic theory.6 A definition of empathy that provides a useful starting
point ought not to commit us to more than the core of the concept, and also
to correspond to modern everyday usage of the term. In these respects, I think
the recent definition given in the New Penguin English Dictionary (2000)—‘the
capacity for understanding and sharing another’s feelings or ideas’—serves
well.
Klein’s Suggestion
Klein suggested more than once that projective identification is the basis of
empathy (two statements of the claim are quoted at the beginning of the paper).
The claim is initially startling for a number of reasons. In the first place, because it
grounds the capacity for empathy, which we typically regard as benign, in a
psychological mechanism that, as Klein describes it, is not only primitive and
defensive, but also irrational, and typically aggressive; a mechanism, moreover,
that involves the agent in misrepresenting other people. This last detail is
particularly obstructive of any rapprochement of empathy and projective
identification, insofar as we regard the former as, at least much of the time, a
reliable source of information—as a means of gaining knowledge (‘from the
inside’, as it is often said) about other people’s minds. How then could empathy
be based in projective identification? The two operations in question seem to
work in diametrically opposed directions.
At this point a summary of Klein’s account of projective identification is in
order. Klein’s claim (first elaborated in her seminal 1946 paper), is that human
beings make wide use of this mechanism of defence in infancy and, although its
character evolves with development, adults remain prone to it in later life.
Projective identification makes use of unconscious phantasy primarily to defend
the infant against impulses—especially destructive ones—arising within him
that provoke intense anxiety and cannot be tolerated. The infant’s own
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aggression, Klein writes, arouses ‘the anxiety of being destroyed from within’
(1946: 5). In response, the infant phantasises that these impulses, ‘bad parts of the
self’ (which, Klein states, the infant often equates with excrements) are expelled
from the self, and lodged inside another person; usually, at this early stage of
development, the mother. In the resultant phantasy, the mother is now
represented (falsely) as the source of the aggression. ‘Much of the hatred against
parts of the self is now directed towards the mother’ (Klein 1946: 8).
This last sentence might suggest that the phenomenon involves a straightfor-
ward substitution, in which properties are ‘relocated’, by means of the projec-
tive phantasy, from the self to another person. In fact, projective identification
is far less straightforward.7 Klein makes it clear that the aspect of identification is
to be taken in a strong sense: that is, the infant feels that part of himself
has literally entered the other person; he might, for example, feel that he can
thereby control them from within (and this sense of ‘occupation’ accounts, Klein
suggests, for feelings of claustrophobia that are associated with the phantasy).
Projective identification is narcissistic, in that the boundaries between self and
other are not understood: a sort of merger takes place, so that the mother is used,
not as a dustbin for parts of the self, but as an extension of the self. It is not
surprising then that, although projective identification is a normal part of
infantile development, its persistence (or regression to it) underlies psychotic
illness in adult life.
This characterisation of projective identification, as a psychotic defence
mechanism that disrupts the differentiation of self and other cannot be reconciled
with empathy (which requires a sense of the distinction between the self and the
other). It is significant that the connection Klein draws between the two
phenomena is not mentioned in the 1946 paper; it appears, rather, in the later
papers of 1955 and 1959 quoted above. By then the idea of ‘projective
identification’ had been in circulation for several years, and had begun to be
taken up, with differing emphases, by different analysts. Klein must, I think, have
been thinking of the ‘projective mechanism’ she alludes to in a weaker sense. It is
probably relevant, too, that the 1959 article was written for a non-specialist
readership, which may have encouraged Klein to give herself more leeway in the
use of her terms.
Some of Klein’s followers, though, in endorsing her remarks, have failed to
take due account of the difficulty in making sense of them. R.D. Hinshelwood, for
example, tries to demonstrate Klein’s claim, by exploiting the very metaphor—of
‘putting oneself in another’s shoes’—that she used in 1959:
When one talks of ‘putting oneself in someone else’s shoes’ this is a
description of empathy, but it is also a description of inserting a part of
oneself, some capacity for self-perception, into someone else’s position—
in particular it is an experiencing part of oneself that is inserted in order
to gain, in phantasy, their experience. This is a normal enough activity on
the part of sensitive people, and can be loosely included within the group
of phantasies of projective identification. (Hinshelwood 1991: 295)
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This claim, once examined, surely fails: empathy does not involve inserting any
‘part of oneself’ into another person. Characterising that ‘part’ as a capacity for
self-perception fudges the issue but in any case the idea conveyed by the ‘shoes’
metaphor is that one takes up the other person’s point of view. This requires one to
see the things the way they see them, which involves an imaginative
reconstruction of their experience, rather than any phantasy of ‘gaining’ it, as if
it were available to be plundered. (The metaphor says that it is the other’s shoes
that one enters—that is, their position—not their mind). One senses that
Hinshelwood has to describe things in this odd way to build a bridge between
empathy and the Kleinian understanding of projective identification: fidelity to
the ideas, associated with the latter, of invasion or occupancy of the other person
has caused the distortion here.
There is, nonetheless, a construction of projective identification, implicit in Klein’s
own thinking, that makes better sense of her suggestion about empathy. Another
Kleinian disciple, Betty Joseph, exploits this, in her version of the suggestion:
In its earliest forms projective identification has no concern for the
objectyAs the child moves toward the depressive position this
necessarily alters: although projective identification is probably never
entirely given up, it will no longer involve the complete splitting off and
disowning of parts of the self, but will be less absolute, more temporary,
and more able to be drawn back into the individual’s personality—and
thus be the basis of empathy. (Joseph 1988: 66)
In referring here to the ‘depressive position’, Joseph is drawing on Klein’s
important distinction between the two fundamental structures that, she thinks,
characterise the mind. Of these, the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ position is the earliest,
and projective identification, as Klein describes it in 1946, is a ‘splitting’
mechanism typical of that position in which (as the name implies) persecutory
anxiety is dominant. In normal psychological development, the paranoid-
schizoid position is superseded by the depressive position, in which the person’s
representation, both of his own qualities, and those of others, is far more realistic.
This more realistic representation reflects the person’s increased capacity to
tolerate unwelcome impulses that, earlier, he might have been driven to project
into others: the use of ‘splitting’ mechanisms declines. And, insofar as object-
relations in the depressive position become less persecutory and paranoid,
realistic ‘concern’ for other people becomes possible.8
Joseph’s thought, then, is that against this ‘depressive position’ backcloth,
where a relatively stable psychic constellation is in place, temporary uses of
projective identification, that can be ‘drawn back into theypersonality’ can
provide the basis of empathy. How much further does this suggestion take us, in
terms of a reconciliation of projective identification with empathy? At first sight,
it might seem that it is no help at all: if, for example, projective identification is as
distorting and confused as Klein suggests, how can it make any difference if it is
only temporary?
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I think, however, that Joseph’s thought can be illuminating if we focus on the
other part of her suggestion: less pathological instances of projective identifica-
tion are not only ‘more temporary’, but also ‘less absolute’. We can take this
phrase as implying that, in these instances, projective identification does less
violence to, is less at odds with, reality. In such cases, what may happen is that a
person, correctly perceiving a certain state in someone else, ‘empathises’ with it in
order to be able to ‘live it out’ in that person, at one remove. Where such a state
would be difficult to acknowledge as their own, they can gain satisfaction from
this vicarious involvement.9 In such cases, ‘empathic’ interest in another’s state
has a projective aspect, even though it does not misrepresent the state: it is
motivated by a desire to focus on that sort of state as found in the other person, to
avoid the responsibility, as it were, of direct ownership.
Anna Freud’s brilliant, debunking analysis of ‘a form of altruism’ published in
1936 (a decade before Klein coined the term ‘projective identification’) illustrates
this vicarious dimension to some types of interpersonal concern. Anna Freud
cites a patient, employed as a governess, whose childhood desires to have
children and beautiful clothes appeared, in adult life, to have evaporated:
What chiefly struck one about her as an adult was her unassuming
character and the modesty of the demands which she made on life. When
she came to be analyzed, she was unmarried and childless and her dress
was rather shabby and inconspicuous. She showed little sign of envy or
ambition and would compete with other people only if she were forced
to do so by external circumstances. One’s first impression was thatyshe
had developed in exactly the opposite direction from what her childhood
would have led one to expect and that her wishes had been
repressedy(Freud 1936: 124)
As she acquired more knowledge of this patient, however, Anna Freud came
to think that this first impression was mistaken. Rather than repressing her
wishes, this patient pursued them vicariously (thus conforming to a familiar
stereotype of the unfulfilled spinster, or maiden aunt):
When her life was examined in more detail, it was clear that her original
wishes were affirmed in a manner which seemed scarcely possible if
repression had taken place. The repudiation of her own sexuality did not
prevent her from taking an affectionate interest in the love life of her
women friends and colleagues. She was an enthusiastic matchmaker and
many love affairs were confided to her. Although she took no trouble
about her own dress, she displayed a lively interest in her friends’
clothes. Childless herself, she was devoted to other people’s childreny
She might be said to display an unusual degree of concern about her
friends’ having pretty clothes, being admired and having children
Similarly, in spite of her own retiring behaviour, she was ambitious for
the men whom she loved and followed their careers with the utmost
interest. It looked as if her own life had been emptied of interests and
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wishes; up to the time of her analysis it was almost entirely uneventful.
Instead of exerting herself to achieve any aims of her own, she expended
all her energy in sympathizing with the experiences of people she cared
for. She lived in the lives of other people, instead of having any
experience of her own. (Freud 1936: 124–5)
Anna Freud’s intention in this paper was to unmask the ‘egoistic’ gratification
present in an apparently ‘altruistic’ attitude of ‘sympathetic’ involvement.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assume that in the case she describes the
woman’s extreme involvement in other people’s lives necessarily detracted from
the accuracy of her perception of their experiences. The people in whom she took
such interest may not have felt misunderstood (although it seems plausible to
suppose that they might have found her concern excessive or intrusive). Indeed,
the ‘hunger’ of someone who denies herself certain experiences might enhance
her perceptiveness of them in others: the gratification promised by empathic
experience may foster an alertness to opportunities to undergo it.
This said, however, there is an important respect in which someone’s
‘projective’ motivation must limit their capacity for empathy. The range of
experiences she takes empathic interest in will be narrow, restricted to the types
of experience she is disposed to project. And, once empathic interest has been
engaged, it seems possible that the desire for vicarious satisfaction might hinder
any further curiosity, leading the subject to over-assimilate another’s wishes (say)
to her own, and to overlook the respects in which they differ.
This way of substantiating Klein’s suggestion about the relationship between
projective identification and empathy overcomes the problem posed by the
apparent opposition between the former, as Klein describes it in 1946, and the
latter. In place of outright opposition, the suggestion (as Joseph seems to
understand it), is that exercises of empathy may be tinged, to a varying extent, by
a projective motivation that is ‘less absolute’, and therefore less distorting, than
the psychotic defence mechanism of early infancy. This psychoanalytical
understanding of empathy supplements our everyday understanding of it—as
an exercise in ‘sharing and understanding’ another’s state(s) of mind—by
situating each such exercise in relation to the unconscious significance of the
exercise for the subject. This unconscious significance is itself determined by the
subject’s own attitude towards the existence in herself of the types of state that she
empathises with when they occur in somebody else. A spectrum stretches
between the two ‘positions’, paranoid-schizoid and depressive, differentiated by
Klein, and the normative dimension associated with this distinction is reflected in
its impact on empathy. Thus, those instances of empathy at the more paranoid-
schizoid end of the spectrum will be the most ‘blind’, most opportunistic, and
most inflexible in their understanding of the other person, while those at the
depressive end will be the ‘best’ cases, open to a wider range of experience in the
other person, and more open to discovery.
If this psychoanalytic insight about empathy is correct, we might expect it to
be acknowledged—along with many other psychoanalytical ideas—in lay
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thinking about empathy. Klein believes that it is: in the 1955 paper, she states that
‘the projective mechanism underlying empathy is familiar in everyday life’ and
in the later one, as we have seen, she claims that the everyday talk of ‘putting
oneself in another’s shoes’ captures the same connection. She follows this last
point with an observation about the danger of the projective aspect of empathy:
‘There are people who go so far in this direction that they lose themselves entirely
in others and become incapable of objective judgement’. Here, again, she is
suggesting that an everyday insight—about the danger of over-absorption in
others—recognises the phenomenon theorised in her writings.
Further Developments in Psychoanalysis: Clinical Empathy
In the 1950s—the decade in which Klein threw out her remarks about the
connection between projective identification and empathy—these ideas were also
informing the momentous debate, within the psychoanalytical movement, about
the significance of the analyst’s emotional response to the patient, or ‘counter-
transference’. In a seminal paper of 1950, Paula Heimann (who started out as a
disciple of Klein’s), argued that the analyst’s countertransference, handled
properly, was a valuable clinical resource, ‘an instrument of research into the
patient’s unconscious’ (Heimann 1950: 81). In this Heimann departed from the
‘intellectualist’ orthodoxy of her time, inherited from Freud, according to which
feelings stirred up in the analyst by the patient were at best irrelevant, and often
obstructive, to the analysis and a likely indication that the analyst himself
required further analysis. Klein, however, stuck to the traditional view and a rift
with Heimann occurred. This development in the understanding of the
countertransference, and related developments in the theory of projective
identification, occurred without Klein’s assent. Kleinian practitioners today have
followed the splinter group on this issue. Nevertheless, the initially heterodox
line of thought they developed gives an account of the role of projective
identification in empathy that amplifies and lends further support to Klein’s
suggestion.
This period in the history of psychoanalytical theory is very complicated, and
the ideas of empathy and projective identification figure within it in a number of
different ways.10 Roger Money-Kyrle’s 1956 contribution to the countertransfer-
ence debate is of particular interest here: he argues, against the ‘intellectualist’
tradition, that the analyst’s understanding of the patient is achieved in large part
through empathy and that empathy itself deploys projective identification.
Money-Kyrle suggests that psychoanalytical work taps the analyst’s parental
impulses: symbolically, the patient stands to the analyst as a child to a parent.
(Here Money-Kyrle, registering his dissent from classical Freudian thinking,
maintains that the analyst’s scientific curiosity is, on its own, ‘a little too
impersonal’ to consitute his motivation (1956: 23)). And, if the patient stands for a
child, a child stands, in turn, for ‘an early aspect of the [parent’s] self’ (p. 23):
thus, in understanding the patient, the analyst exploits his understanding of his
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own early self (which, Money-Kyrle implies, will, in consequence of the analysis
he has himself undergone, be excellent). Empathy involves identifications, of
both projective and introjective types. The projective phase, which concerns us
here, is that ‘in which the patient is the representative of a former immature or ill
part of [the analyst], including his damaged objects, which he can now
understand and therefore treat by interpretation, in the external world’ (pp. 23-4).
Money-Kyrle’s account of the psychoanalyst’s empathy with his patient
illustrates a ‘lucid’, psychically sophisticated, use of projective identification
which, because it involves projection of part(s) of the self accepted by the analyst
does not carry the risk of distortion which accompanies the blinder (dissociative,
or vicarious) uses of the mechanism we have considered. The projective
identification employed in this type of empathy, then, is as far towards the
‘depressive position’ end of the spectrum identified earlier as possible, and
improves on that exemplified in the case of the governess described by Anna
Freud. Where a high level of psychological integration has been achieved, so that
there is no need for the person either to deny, or to distance himself from, aspects
of his self, projective identification can be used to record a commonality between
individuals, and to provide a template by means of which another person may be
understood. As Money-Kyrle notes, an exercise of this sort will still provide
satisfaction by virtue of its unconscious significance: the ‘reliving’ of an
encounter with an earlier or more immature self can consolidate, for the analyst,
his understanding of those aspects of himself; or it may provide new
opportunities to express impulses that his present self-understanding entails
(Money-Kyrle mentions reparative impulses in this context). For Money-Kyrle,
then, the beneficial and ‘normal’ use of countertransference occurs within
empathic transactions that involve the analyst’s projection of parts of his self that
have been understood. ‘Deviant’ countertransference, constituting an impediment
to the analysis, arises when ‘the patient corresponds too closely with some aspect
of [the analyst] which he has not yet learnt to understand’ (p. 24).
According to this psychoanalytical model, the degree of psychic integration
possessed by someone determines their ability to empathise effectively with
other people. The ‘self-possessed’ person has, at his disposal, the widest range of
experiences with which to identify in others, and the maximal capacity for
accurate empathic engagement. Klein’s suggestion, developed in this way,
articulates a normative dimension to empathy that provides a criterion by which
one can discriminate ‘defective’ instances and, at the same time, an account of
their defectiveness.11
This psychoanalytical account also substantiates, and vindicates (at least in
part) Nietzsche’s rejection of the value of ‘pity’.12
Nietzsche vs Schopenhauer
Nietzsche’s thinking on this subject, as in so many other areas, converges with
psychoanalytical theory: one of his chief criticisms of the ‘philosophy of pity’ is
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that it misrepresents the pitier’s experience as ‘altruistic’ and, according to this
line of thought, admirable, when in fact it serves thoroughly egoistic ends. The
objection here is not of course to egoism—Nietzsche is, repeatedly, profoundly
suspicious of the value of altruism—but to the stupidity (thoughtlessness, as he
puts it (Daybreak: §133)), of those who conceive of pity as altruistic. In the passage
from Daybreak quoted at the start of the paper Nietzsche claims that even though
one may not, ‘in the feeling of pity’, consciously be thinking of oneself, one is
‘doing so very strongly unconsciously’. A few lines later he suggests, as Anna Freud
suggested about altruism, that one form of this unconscious self-involvement in
others’ plights is vicarious: ‘an accident and suffering incurred by another
constitutes a signpost to some danger to us’.
Scattered throughout Nietzsche’s writings, in addition, is the claim that
concern with others—of which pity is just an instance—is often a sign of a need to
escape oneself. Nietzsche’s comments here endorse Klein’s perception of
the danger, in empathy, of ‘losing oneself in others’. In the passage of Thus
Spake Zarathustra entitled ‘Of Love of One’s Neighbour’, Nietzsche says, ‘You flee
to your neighbour away from yourselves and would like to make a virtue
of it: but I see through your ‘‘selflessness’’’ (TSZ: 86). This ‘fleeing’ into other-
directed concern betokens a deficiency in self-love, according to Nietzsche: ‘Your
love of your neighbour is your bad love of yourselves’ (p. 86). One’s ‘neighbour’,
in consequence, is needed to serve as a witness, testifying for a good image of
oneself that could not be sustained without him: ‘You invite in a witness
when you want to speak well of yourselves; and when you have misled him into
thinking well of you, you then think well of yourselves’ (p. 87). In Beyond Good
and Evil Nietzsche also invokes the possessive attitude of those who wish to
help and, again, highlights the unacknowledged gain that motivates ‘helpful and
charitable people’: ‘one almost always finds that clumsiness which first adjusts
and adapts him who is to be helpedywith these imaginings they dispose of
those in need as if they were possessions’ (BGE: §194).
Nietzsche also suggests that pity typically betokens weakness in the face of
suffering, and an incorrect evaluation of it. The weakness is manifested in the
passive attitude that, Nietzsche suggests, both the pitier and the pitied one adopt
towards suffering: it is indulged in, rather than overcome. Nietzsche suggests
that with this type of pity, there is gratification in the sufferer’s state. Perversely,
pity, by choosing to dwell with suffering, makes a cult of it:
yof what account is the pity of those who suffer! Or, worse, of those who
preach pity! There exists almost everywhere in Europe today a morbid
sensitivity and susceptibility to pain, likewise a repellent intemperance in
lamentation, a tenderization which, with the aid of religion and odds and
ends of philosophy, would like to deck itself out as something higher—
there exists a downright cult of suffering. The unmanliness of that which
is in such fanatic circles baptized ‘pity’ is, I think, the first thing which
leaps to the eye. (BGE: §293)
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In this passage, Nietzsche contrasts this attitude to suffering with the strength
shown towards the weak by ‘a man who is by nature master’. Here, as in other
passages, Nietzsche’s aversion to submission to feeling sounds an unexpectedly
Kantian note, and indeed, in Daybreak, Nietzsche explicitly opposes Kant to
Schopenhauer’s ‘philosophy of pity’:
Kant still stands outside this movement: he expressly teaches that we
must be insensible towards the suffering of others if our beneficence is to
possess moral value—which Schopenhauer, in a wrath easy to
comprehend, calls Kantian insipidity. (Daybreak: §132)13
The incorrect evaluation of suffering shown in the philosophical ‘movement’
that Nietzsche deplores appears in its assumption that suffering ought
necessarily to be abolished. Nietzsche, instead, draws a distinction between a
superior type of pity, associated with the artist and creator, which regards
suffering as a discipline and the (presumably Christian) pity that understands
man as a creature, ‘pampers’ and ‘weakens’ him (BGE: 225). The superior type of
pity is invoked also in Thus Spake Zarathustra, where Nietzsche derides the
(ordinarily) ‘compassionate’: ‘Alas, where in the world have there been greater
follies than with the compassionate? And what in the world has caused more
suffering than the follies of the compassionate?’ (TSZ: 114). Instead of the
‘shameless’ attitude of compassionate people, Nietzsche urges greater discretion
in one’s handling of distress: ‘if you have a suffering friend, be a resting-place for
his suffering, but a resting-place like a hard bed, a camp-bed: thus you will serve
him best’ (TSZ: 113-4).14
Of course, not every aspect of Nietzsche’s attitude to pity has a counterpart in
psychoanalytical thinking. In particular, Nietzsche’s idea that pain, pleasure, and
even ‘wellbeing’ are incorrect measures of the value of experience, and his
alternative ideal of self-creation are not held in common. Nonetheless Nietzsche’s
negative assessment of the experience ofMitleid, and the account he gives of the gain
that such an experience affords the pitier, displays a thoroughgoing anticipation of
the psychoanalytical notion of projective identification. We do not know which
German term, if any, Klein—a native German speaker—may have had at the back of
her mind when she wrote, in English, of the projective basis of empathy but her
analysis finds striking confirmation in Nietzsche’s attack on Mitleid.
This brings us to the important issue of terminology. It may look as if the
comparison of Nietzsche with Klein is forced, and his attack on pity carries no
implications for empathy. Certainly, the two English terms do not coincide in
meaning and have different connotations (for example, pity is frequently
regarded, in ordinary thinking, as an unwelcome attitude, while empathy on
the whole is not). However, if one bears in mind the fact that Nietzsche’s
criticisms are often directed against Schopenhauer; considers the German terms
that these philosophers used; examines closely the content of some of their
claims; and, finally, takes into account some relevant lexicographical history, the
convergence that I am pointing to here is supported.
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While Nietzsche’s English translators, as we have seen, render the target of his
criticisms as ‘pity’, Schopenhauer’s translators use the term ‘compassion’ for the
emotional experience to which Schopenhauer attaches such ethical importance,
and which Nietzsche aims to discredit.15 In the German, however, both thinkers
use the same word,Mitleid. (And this, of course, signals more clearly to readers of
the original German texts than the English translations can, that Nietzsche is
disagreeing with Schopenhauer). If one were to translate Mitleid as ‘literally’ as
possible, in such a way as to make its structure transparent, one might say
‘suffering with’ (the structure of the English word ‘compassion’, then, makes it a
better choice in this respect than ‘pity’). Presumably, the explanation for the
translators’ different choice of terms is, as we have noted, that the English word
‘pity’, in some contexts, already has negative associations: Nietszche, we might
say, construes Schopenhauer’s Mitleid as ‘pity’ when he criticises it—or so his
translators seem to have thought. On the other hand, their choice of ‘pity’ has the
cost mentioned above: unlike ‘compassion’, it fails to mirror in its structure the
idea of sharing or accompanying another in their suffering (‘co-suffering’), which
Mitleid conveys. And some of Nietzsche’s remarks make it clear that this specific
feature of Mitleid is something he has in mind in criticising it:
Why double your ‘ego’!—To view our own experiences with the eyes with
which we are accustomed to view them when they are the experiences of
others—this is very comforting and a medicine to be recommended. On
the other hand, to view and imbibe the experiences of others as if they
were ours—as is the demand of a philosophy of pity—this would destroy
usy(Nietzsche, Daybreak: §137)
My claim is that, although it would be incorrect (for a number of interesting
reasons, mentioned below) to translate Schopenhauer’s termMitleid as ‘empathy’,
it is nonetheless conceived by him as an empathic experience, and that at least
some of Nietzsche’s rejection of it rests on his disagreement with Schopenhauer
about the nature and value of empathic involvement. Thus Nietzsche’s thinking
does, indeed, anticipate Klein’s conception of empathy. But why then doesn’t
Schopenhauer use (the German for) ‘empathy’? Here some fascinating lexico-
graphical history comes into play: a dedicated term for empathy was coined only
in the early twentieth century, when it was introduced first into German (as
Einfu¨hlung) and then, translated, into English (‘empathy’, a new coinage in
English, entering the language in order to translate the German term).16
Einfu¨hlung, then, was not historically available for use either by Schopenhauer
or Nietzsche, and it would be historically misleading to translate Mitleid as
‘empathy’. Nonetheless, the features that Schopenhauer highlights in his
description of Mitleid are, unmistakably, empathic. Schopenhauer emphasises,
repeatedly, that the experience of Mitleid is one in which a person adopts the
perspective of the (suffering) other.17 This leads Schopenhauer to claim, at times,
that the person also takes on, in feeling, the suffering itself—‘in the case of [the
other’s] woe as such, I suffer directly with him, I feel his woe just as I ordinarily do
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only my owny’ (Schopenhauer 1839: §16, 144). It is this sort of talk that invites
Nietzsche’s charge, quoted earlier, against ‘doubling one’s ego’. Schopenhauer’s
emphasis on the likeness of feeling here leads him too close to a suggestion
frequently associated with empathic experience, from which he wishes to
dissociate himeself: namely, that Mitleid involves a confusion of self with the
other.18 Schopenhauer has to reject this suggestion if he is to preserve the
separation he desires, which we have seen Nietzsche ridicule, between Mitleid
and egoism. So he insists, against a writer called Cassina, that the compassionate
imagination is not ‘deceived’: ‘His view is that compassion arises from an
instantaneous deception of the imagination, since we put ourselves in the
position of the sufferer, and have the idea that we are suffering his pains in our
person. This is by no means the case; on the contrary, at every moment we
remainyconscious that he is the sufferer, not we; and it is precisely in his person,
not in ours, that we feel the sufferingyWe suffer with him and hence in him; we
feel his pain as his, and do not imagine that it is ours. In fact the happier our state,
and hence the more our consciousness of it is contrasted with the other man’s
fate, the more susceptible we are to compassion’ (Schopenhauer 1839: §16, 147).
For Schopenhauer, as this quotation shows, Mitleid is a source of lucid
emotional insight about the other, and represents a valuable cognitive and ethical
achievement. Nietzsche, on the other hand, believes that this sort of involvement
is, typically, an expression of weakness, and imbalance within the self. The
psychoanalytical suggestion about empathy that we have been considering
allows the possibility that both may be partially correct. We can say that
Schopenhauer’s conception, exaggerating the ‘altruism’ of the phenomenon, is of
‘depressive position’ empathy while Nietzsche, more pessimistically, focuses on
the blindest, most projective instances of empathy, closer to the ‘paranoid-
schizoid’ end of the spectrum.19
Recent Discussion of Empathy Within the Philosophy of Mind: Advantages of
the Psychoanalytical Perspective
We have seen how, construed along the right lines, Klein’s suggestion accredits
and substantiates our sense that instances of empathy can be more or less benign,
more or less valuable from an ethical point of view. It accommodates the
phenomenon of unhealthy interpersonal empathic involvement, in which a
person’s interest in others’ feelings is damagingly limited by distortions in their
self-knowledge. Klein’s ‘depressive position’, with its acknowledgement of the
separateness of persons, provides the basis for the ‘right’ sort of empathic
engagement, from an ethical point of view.
The same phenomenon accounts also for a source of epistemological
inadequacy in empathy: the ‘escapist’ aspirations of blindly projective exercises
of empathy severely limit a person’s openness to discovery. Someone whose
empathy is motivated by a desire to find and relish some particular state(s) in
another person will either lose interest or fail to notice if that person does not
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quite fit the bill. And further, insofar as a person pursuing these gratifying
experiences of empathy will be concerned to locate the mental states in question
in others, he will not be able to draw on any self-understanding to provide an
information resource. In other words, he will lack the ‘template’ of personal
experience that Money-Kyrle’s description of the most lucid type of empathy
invokes.20
These features of the psychoanalytical account of empathy provide a
motivational setting for it, and articulate an important dimension (which, I have
argued, corresponds to ordinary intuition) for its evaluation. In comparison, I
think, the conception of empathy that has dominated recent discussion in the
philosophy of mind appears impoverished and distorted by the framework and
agenda it subserves. A brief overview of this conception will be sufficient to
indicate these shortcomings.21
As mentioned earlier, the framework for most philosophical discussion of
empathy (at least within the analytical tradition) within the last fifteen years or so,
has been the debate between ‘simulation theory’ and ‘theory theory’.22 The debate
is over the correct explanation of our ability to attribute mental states to other
people: do we do this, as simulationists contend, by using our ownminds to model
(‘simulate’) the mental processes of others or rather—as the theory theorists hold—
by applying a theory about psychological processes to them? It is not surprising,
given the prima facie similarities between the ideas of simulation and empathy (the
first-personal perspective, the reproduction of the mental states of another) that
empathy has been fought over by the participants in this debate. Noting these
similarities, simulation theorists have argued, using varying strategies, that the
phenomenon of empathy (whose existence is readily conceded) provides support
for the more controversial model of interpersonal psychological understanding
they propose (Goldman 1993a, 1993b; Gordon 1995; Ravenscroft 1998).
One simulationist line of thought invokes economy of explanation here.
Ravenscroft, for example, uses the computational metaphor that has been
popular in these discussions to express such a claim. The metaphor invites us to
understand exercises of simulation as an ‘off-line’ operation of our mental
economy: in order to simulate other minds, we run our own mind, ‘typically
detached from its usual behavioural outputs’ (Ravenscroft 1998: 179). (If I were
not able to ‘detach’ this part of the mechanism, I would be unable to conclude
from a simulation of someone else that they would behave in a certain way
without behaving in that way myself). Ravenscroft argues that the detachment can
be implemented to various degrees, and situates empathy in terms of this idea:
‘Empathetic experiences occur when, following the introduction of pretend
input, our mental economy is largely detached from behavioural output but
nevertheless engages the mechanism involved in affective responses’ (p. 179).
This account of empathy as a variant of simulation is explanatorily economic,
whereas rival accounts, Ravenscroft claims, involve an implausible ‘duplication
of causal pathways’ within the mind (pp. 174-5).
Alvin Goldman, in similar vein, surveys various applications of the idea of
simulation, and suggests that our ordinary concept of empathy corresponds to a
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narrower sense of simulation, that is ‘specifically concerned with affective or
emotional states’ (1993a: 197). This raises the question of why and how states that
are generated by simulation feel, as empathic states feel, genuinely affective.
Goldman’s reply is that the ‘pretend’ states on which simulation operates are
‘similar to, or homologous to’ the target states that they mimic: they share some
of the same properties. Goldman admits that this ‘similarity’ needs unpacking
but suggests that this gives ‘insufficient reasony to cede this territory to the
skeptic’ (p. 198). Simulation theory is apparently strengthened by its ability to
account for empathy.
These accounts, by forcing empathy into the mould of simulation, do little to
illuminate it. In particular, although the aspect of empathy that is definitionally
central—‘shared feeling’—is acknowledged, it is not explained: nothing helpful is
said about why it occurs, or what function it might serve.
The characterisations of empathy offered by the participants in the simulation
vs theory debate are also unduly polarised by the polemical purposes they serve.
Goldman, for example, argues that the type of empathy based on ‘role-taking’
employs (and is, therefore, evidence for) a simulation mechanism: one takes up
X’s role, as one simulates, by imagining one is in X’s situation (1993b: 95). But, as
Goldman’s opponents point out (Nichols, Stich et al 1996: 65–7), we do not have to
understand ‘role-taking’ in these terms, as a purely imaginative exercise. It can
also be explained in ‘informational’ terms: perhaps one employs one’s own
experience and memory, rather than one’s imagination, to arrive at a conception
of what X’s situation is like. It seems likely in fact that many efforts to
empathically enter into someone else’s situation are informed by both
imagination and memory, as when one deliberately recalls an experience of
one’s own in order to better imagine how it must be for someone else.23
A further criticism levelled against simulationist accounts of empathy is that
they drive an explanatory wedge between ‘high-level’ instances of empathy, that
supposedly deploy the cognitive and conceptual apparatus used in simulation,
and the more primitive phenomena (such as the emotional contagion and motor
mimicry exhibited by newborn infants) that are often thought of as empathic in a
broader sense (Ravenscroft 1998: 181; Goldman 1993b: 143). Such a wedge is not
necessarily illegitimate (it may well be that distinct mechanisms underlie
different types of empathic response); the difficulty, though, is that it seems that
the governing reason for isolating ‘role-taking’ empathy from other types is that
it lends itself to description in simulationist terms. In other words, although it
seems as if empathic phenomena provide independent support for the
simulationist picture, their classification is in fact dictated by that picture.
In general, these simulationist appropriations of empathy focus on its
cognitive and epistemological dimension, and underplay its affective features
(which, as we saw for example in Ravenscroft’s account, are often treated as if
they were gratuitous supplements, accompanying on occasion the core materials
of simulation). This surely distorts the ‘folk’ understanding of empathy, in
which the idea of accompanying another person in feeling figures more centrally
than that of learning something about their state of mind. A further limitation
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of this narrow focus is that nothing is said about the role empathy plays with-
in the psychologies of the people involved or about non-epistemological
aspects of its contribution to interpersonal relationships. (For example the
widespread phenomenon of dispositional empathy, which is often an important
element in relationships between people who know each other well, is not
mentioned).
Although I am not able to provide more than a sketch, I wish to indicate, in the
following section, the importance and centrality of empathic phenomena within
the psychoanalytical understanding of the personality and its development. The
scope of these has not emerged in the preceding discussion (more narrowly
focused on Klein’s claim about empathy and projective identification) but aspects
of the wider picture behind her claim suggest further dimensions of empathy
worthy of further exploration.
‘Intrapersonal’ Empathy
Extending a line of thought introduced in his later writings by Freud, Klein
regards acts of identification, with (for the most part) objects that are ‘internal’, as
essential both to the structure of the personality, and to its development.24
Internal objects are represented, in phantasy, as existing within the body: they are
established by phantasies of incorporation, in which an object (for example, the
maternal breast) is represented as being taken into the self (ingested, for
example). These objects come to constitute the ‘internal world’ that Klein
postulates: their constellation determines the structure of the personality. As we
saw, Klein believes that projective identification can serve to rid the subject, in
phantasy, of parts of his self; correspondingly, she claims, acts of introjective
identification enable the infant to acquire psychological resources.25
For Klein, the most fundamental internal object is the maternal breast. While
its initial introjection may have been for defensive purposes (to protect the infant,
for example, against the fear of its loss), this ‘good’ internal object provides a
crucial focal point for further development:
If the mother is taken into the child’s inner world as a good and
dependable object, an element of strength is added to the ego. For I
assume that the ego develops largely round this good object, and the
identification with the good characteristics of the mother becomes the
basis for further helpful identifications. (Klein 1959: 251)
The internalised good object brings about a real, not just phantasised, increase
in psychological strength, insofar as the maternal perspective and capacities are
felt to be available for the infant to take up and deploy. In other words, through
an internalised empathic relationship, the infant is able to take up a point of view
of himself which strengthens him. (Klein emphasises in particular how important
this is for overcoming the most primitive anxiety, fear of one’s own destructive
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and aggressive impulses. The ego, at birth, is weak and fragmented; strength and
unity are acquired only through the establishment of helpful internal figures,
whose basis rests in turn on the baby’s transactions with its ‘external’ carers).
Thus abiding, dispositional identifications develop and give structure to the
personality: and, in addition to the maternal figure, other internal figures (most
famously, perhaps, the ‘superego’) underpin other perspectives that can be taken
up, and other psychological capacities.26
Pathology, as we have seen, arises when the internal world that develops, for
whatever environmental or innate reasons, is insufficiently facilitating; for
example, when internal objects are felt to be excessively persecutory, and
aggression in consequence spirals. In normal development, the personality
becomes sufficiently integrated to manage the full range of instinctual impulses.
The task of psychoanalysis is to foster this process, by acquainting a person more
fully and explicitly with the shape of his unconscious mind.
This psychoanalytical model accords an important place to empathy within
the psychology of the person. Developmentally, intra-personal acts of empathy
(mediated by, and invoking the perspective of, internal figures) are shown to be
essential to the growth of the personality. And structurally, the mind’s
unconscious representation of itself in terms of object relations packages its
experience in a form that can readily be deployed by empathy. Thus, as Money-
Kyrle’s discussion shows, one’s own relationship with an infantile part of oneself,
for example, makes available a template that can be used in empathic
understanding of another person’s infantile aspects.27 (The fact that Money-
Kyrle, as an analysed and practising psychoanalyst, explicitly understands his
activity in these terms makes no important difference. In people unschooled in
psychoanalytical theory, the projective identification he describes simply occurs,
without their having the resources to name it. The difference is just that in their
case, the unconscious motivation and gain remain unconscious).
The psychoanalytical conception of the mind accords an important develop-
mental role to empathy, suggests the materials with which it works, supplies an
understanding of its motivation, and provides a basis for a normative dimension
that belongs to it. It shows at the same time why empathy is relevant both to
philosophers of mind and to moral psychology.28 For these reasons, Klein’s
intriguing suggestion about empathy, and the psychoanalytical perspective it
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NOTES
1 The titles of some papers written by simulationists—for example, Heal’s (1998)
‘Understanding Other Minds from the Inside’, and Goldman’s (1993a) ‘Empathy, Mind
and Morals’—make this overlap explicit.
2 See Goldman 1993a and Gordon 1995.
3 For example, Kendall Walton (1997) acknowledges the proximity between his
celebrated ‘make-believe’ theory of our response to fiction, and simulation theory. Gregory
Currie (1995, 1997) also puts simulation theory to use within aesthetics.
4 See Gordon 1995 for discussion. Terminological issues in this area are very complicated.
I touch on these later. Goldie 1999 and Darwall 1998 both provide helpful discussion of the
difference between ‘empathy’, ‘sympathy’ and other closely related concepts.
5 The history of the term ‘empathy’ is germane to some claims I make later in the
paper.
6 The entry for ‘empathy’ in the Sixth Edition (1976) of the Concise Oxford English
Dictionary (checked because I happened to have it at home) still retains vestiges of the
aesthetic concept in which the term originated and therefore, I think, sounds rather odd to
the modern ear: ‘Power of projecting one’s personality into (and so fully comprehending)
the object of contemplation’. Clearly the editors at some point felt the same way, as in the
most recent edition of the Concise Oxford (2002), the odd phrase does not appear. Instead,
a definition almost identical with the New Penguin one is provided: ‘[the ability to]
understand and share the feelings of another’.
7 The more straighforward operation of relocation is also recognised in psycho-
analytical theory, and regarded as a widespread phenomenon. It is sometimes suggested
that the term ‘projection’ tout court should be reserved for it, while ‘projective
identification’ is reserved for the more psychotic mechanism Klein describes in 1946.
8 It is important to note that the ‘depressive position’ represents a great psychic
achievement, and that in reality no person can maintain it constantly: under stress,
regression to a more paranoid-schoizoid position occurs. Most people fluctuate between
the two psychic poles.
9 Some of the examples of projective identification that Klein describes (in particular in
her 1955 paper) have this structure. See Klein (1955: 167–71) for discussion of motives
underlying the choice of objects for projective identification.
10 For reasons of space, and focus, I will not discuss the hugely influential account of
projective identification developed by Bion from the 1950s onwards.
11 It also illustrates the way in which the ability to empathise is (as social psychologists
have found) a developmental achievement. See Hoffman 2000 for relevant research.
12 Remarks about pity are scattered throughout Nietzsche’s writings, and it is
criticised on several counts. See Sprigge 2000, where twelve objections to pity raised by
Nietzsche are distinguished and discussed. Here I am just concerned with those criticisms
that exhibit, as I suggest, his concurrence with and anticipation of psychoanalytical
thinking.
13 Kaufmann (1974: 365) also draws attention to Nietzsche’s conscription of Plato,
Spinoza and La Rochefoucauld as allies ‘united on one point: their low opinion of pity’
(GM, Preface, §5). And Nussbaum 1994 argues that Nietzsche’s atttitude towards pity and
mercy revives the values of the Stoics.
14 The idea of an other, ‘better’ type of pity is a minor but recurrent theme in
Nietzsche’s writings. See Staten (1990: 153–5) for discussion of another distinction beween
forms of identification in Nietzche’s early writings.
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15 Although there is discussion of compassion in the Fourth Book of Schopenhauer’s
World as Will as Representation (1819), his account of compassion is most fully stated in his
On The Basis of Morality (1839), on which I draw here.
16 Although he was not the first to use it, the German psychologist Theodor Lipps
gave prominence to the term Einfu¨hlung (literally, ‘feeling-in’) in work published in 1903.
In its earliest German uses, the term describes an aesthetic experience, in which the
spectator ‘enters into’ a work of art. Lipps extended the term, beyond this aesthetic
context, when he claimed Einfu¨hlung was involved in our understanding of other minds.
As the term, structurally, means ‘feeling-in’, it is tempting to think that Klein’s knowledge
of the German word may have encouraged her in connecting it with projective
identification. Freud uses Einfu¨hlung a number of times in his works, in a way that
suggests his conception of it is indebted to Lipps (whose work he knew). See Pigman 1995
for an excellent account of Freud’s usage.
17 One difference between Schopenhauer’s term Mitleid and ‘empathy’ that should be
mentioned, however (although I do not think it raises any difficulty for my discussion) is
that Mitleid, unlike empathy, is restricted to painful experiences (leid meaning ‘suffering’).
Mitfreude in German—‘rejoicing with’—provides a positive counterpart to Mitleid. One
might argue that, given Schopenhauer’s ethical interest in the concept, the restriction
makes sense: the role of Mitleid is to alert someone to the nature of another’s suffering,
which thereby motivates them to relieve it.
18 Hoffman’s major psychological study of the role of empathy in moral development
notes a tendency for empathic experience to slide into ‘egoistic drift’, in which the
imaginary ‘I’ (of the victim) is eclipsed, as it were, by the actual ‘I’ (2000: 56).
19 Although, as we have seen, Nietzsche alludes at times to a ‘superior’ type of pity, of
which, it appears, few people are capable. I do not wish to suggest that recognising this
difference in the types of empathy that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche focus on explains all
their disagreement on the subject.
20 In a (forthcoming) companion paper to the present one I consider in more detail the
distortions in a person’s understanding of others’ mental states that projective
identification produces, and consider the implications on the simulation vs theory theory
debate of taking these into account.
21 To speak of ‘the’ conception in the singular is to simplify. There are differences of
detail within the simulationist accounts on offer. Nonetheless I think they are sufficiently
similar for the simplification not to matter.
22 For example, Kennett 2002, which is not even concerned with the debate,
nonetheless borrows its characterisation of empathy ‘construed as this imagina-
tive process of simulation’. Holton and Langton 1998, also not principally concerned
with that debate, likewise invokes the simulationist model as ‘roughly synonymous’ with
empathy.
23 Adams (2001: 380) also invokes the possibility of an ‘information-based’ account of
empathy against Ravenscroft.
24 See Bronstein 2001 for an overview of the Kleinian understanding of internal
objects, and its origins in Freud’s thought.
25 This sketch simplifies, and omits many qualifications to, Klein’s account but it
captures the elements that are important for my purposes here.
26 The notion of dispositional identification is therefore central to the Kleinian view.
Dispositional identifications occur with external figures too. As mentioned earlier, this
notion remedies a lacuna in the simulationist model, which fails to account for those
empathic experiences that seem to occur spontaneously, without any initiating act of
262 Sarah Richmond
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
simulative imagination. An initiating act is not necessary in these cases, because the other
person’s point of view has become habitual.
27 Money-Kyrle’s model of empathy overcomes therefore the polarisation mentioned
earlier between simulationist and ‘informational’ accounts: on this model, empathy is an
imaginative exercise that makes use of information about the self.
28 I have not pursued the third line of thought, implicit in my earlier remarks, that a
psychoanalytical perspective on empathy might also illuminate its aesthetic applications.
Richard Wollheim explores this idea in several of his writings: see for example Wollheim
(1984: 213-5) for an account of the forms of projection said to underlie the perception of
nature and the appreciation of art. Price 1992 helpfully surveys and evaluates the ‘genetic
projectivism’ that can be extrapolated from psychoanalysis for value theory.
29 This paper was mostly written during a period of research leave co-funded by the
AHRB: I am grateful for their support. It has benefited from discussion with Gudrun von
Tevenar (specifically about Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and German terminology) and Neil
Vickers (in relation to psychoanalytical ideas and literature). Thanks to both of them, and
also to the anonymous EJP referee who made some helpful suggestions, including the title.
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